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In loving memory of Tess,  a wilful and feisty cairn 
terrier,  who was killed on the road the week before I began to 
write,  and of Ginny, a loving lurcher whose sudden death shortly 





There have always been animals in my life. I have long had a love affair 
with horses; dogs, too, feature strongly in my emotions and in my house.  
And not only companion animals,  but also the wild creatures that 
surround us all. Even in London, in the postwar devastation I witnessed 
while growing up, I learned the joy of watching the birds in the trees. 
 
In what sometimes seems another life, I trained as a scientist. 
Ambivalent though I was about doing biology (surely I could not bear 
the thought of cutting up dead animals?), I ended up studying just that. 
For years, I agonized over the fate of animals in the laboratories, and my 
own role as a student of biology in that fate. Here, I want to tell 
something of my own story - how I survived doing science, but how my 
relationships with animals finally persuaded me that science was too 
disrespectful. 
    
If now I can speak of these things, it is partly because I no longer work 
in the laboratories. Courage to speak is always easier for those on the 
outside.  But it is also partly born of my feminism,  which has 
encouraged me to ask questions that are troubling - even about the 
science that I was doing.  Silence helps no one. 
 
Becoming a scientist 
      
Becoming a scientist - like any other professional training - is a gradual 
process of learning: students must learn not only facts, but also how 
scientists behave. Much of this is gained informally, at coffee and 
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conferences. Gradually, you learn how to look at the world through 
scientists' eyes, how to ask "scientific" questions, and what counts as 
scientific knowledge and what does not. 
 
Submerged in all this learning are two critical distinctions. One is that 
knowledge only 'counts' if it is gained through scientific method; thus, 
the knowledge of people who live or work with animals does not count. 
The second is that there are (at least) two kinds of animals. Scientists, 
like anyone else, might have very personalized relationships with 
companion animals at home. Yet, in the laboratory,  the 'lab animal' 
becomes a tool of the trade, a sensitive piece of apparatus. 
 
In telling my own story now I realize that I had to live with these two 
contradictions. I acknowledged both ways of knowing, and I accepted 
two quite different ways of being with animals. Yet despite these 
overwhelming dilemmas, there were also good reasons to learn science. 
One is that I was fascinated by it, by natural history and especially by 
animals.The budding eight-year-old, pony-mad scientist learned to recite 
the Latin names of every single bone in the vertebrate skeleton - 
provided it had an equine form around it. Moreover, no one in my family 
thought that girls could not do science; on the contrary, I was given 
chemistry sets and learned to build radios. 
   
I had moreover long been drawn to natural history; surely I thought,  
science would enable me to study animals and plants in detail. Yet I was  
ambivalent about doing biology precisely because of the need to do 
things to animals. Twice over in my early training, I tried to concentrate 
on the physical sciences: but always something drew me back to biology. 
The fascination with the living world won out, even though I had to steel 
myself against the need to do dissections - or worse. I often wonder, 
when I hear people express concern about the need for people to 
understand more science, how many have been put off it for life by 
having to cut into animal flesh.  
 
Thirty years later, I can still feel vividly that sense of horror at school as 
I was confronted  with a white rabbit with pink ears, for dissection. I said 
nothing: you were simply expected to get on with it. Even by age 17, I 
had been socialized not to show emotion; I did after all, want to do 
science.  Alongside the sense of revulsion however was another emotion, 
a sense of fascination at the beauty of (once) living tissues, at how they 
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are put together. For all that I think dissection is unnecessary in 
biological education, it seems important to say that seeing 'what the 
animal was made of' did have an impact. 
   
So  while I hated the very idea of picking out the frog that was to be 
killed (which I handed to a friend to kill, rather than bear doing it 
myself), there was a profound sense of awe as we stood together gazing 
at the iridescent skin, the slowly moving red blood cells, through the 
microscope. I cannot ever justify that animal's death; but I do know that 
the awe stayed with me,  making me feel even more strongly just how 
beautiful animals are. 
 
Yet whatever one's aesthetic reaction, scientific training soon makes the 
student learn to suppress emotions. Slowly, you need to learn not to 
show questioning reactions to the use of animals, living or dead. Insofar 
as aesthetic or emotional reactions are encouraged in scientific training, 
these are likely to be responses to what nature has become after the 
processes of science. Scientists might  for instance, express pleasure or 
even excitement at the colours or the orderliness of cells in a photograph 
taken with an electron microscope, just as I felt a kind of fascinated 
pleasure at the colours and textures of the tissues from the animal I had 
to dissect. But expressing anxiety about the sufferings of living animals 
in laboratories comes suspiciously close to the rhetoric of animal rights 
and would only be discouraged. 
   
Budding scientists must learn to deny such feelings of empathy. Indeed,  
those feelings are considered 'unmanly' as the entomologist Miriam 
Rothschild once noted in a lecture. Whatever else it involves, becoming 
a scientist entails learning to acquire, or fit into, the macho culture of the 
laboratory  and forswearing such 'feminine' responses as empathy with 
the animals. In that sense, the suppression of empathy or other emotions 
in scientific training is a gendered experience. 
 
With  all these contradictions and dilemmas in the background, I began a 
research career with some unease. Somehow I ended up doing animal 
behaviour research which at least allowed me to study what animals do 
and is perhaps less disrespectful than many other areas of biology. 
Despite all my turbulent feelings about animals and nature however I had 
been sufficiently desensitized to toe the line:  ambivalence 
notwithstanding,  I did laboratory-based research - for a while. 
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Yet alongside that I was also involved in both the Women's Movement 
and in environmental activism. Out of those politics, I questioned more 
and more what science was all about:  what kinds of issues, for instance,  
influence how science is done. To begin with I continued with research 
justifying it to myself as long as nothing too nasty was done to the 
animals and they were well cared for. Much of my research was 
motivated by feminist questions - issues to do with women and health for 
example  - for which at that time I was prepared to swallow my 
conscience and use animals as 'models' for humans. Only later did I 
explicitly question the use of animals altogether, and the fact that 
keeping them in laboratories must inevitably mean their exploitation and 
subsequent deaths. 
   
It seems to me that it is an abuse of animals, not respect, (let alone the 
economic considerations) that allows large numbers of animals to be 
bred only to be wasted.  Animals are killed routinely in laboratories.  
Some are 'sacrificed' in the course of an experiment; many more are 
killed simply because no one uses them on time or because scientists 
from one laboratory in the building don't particularly talk to those in 
another. The result is that in different laboratories, animals are killed for 
different parts of their bodies, when laboratories could co-operate and 
thus save lives. I find it odd that the numbers of animals killed because 
they are not 'needed' for experiments seems to merit far less attention 
from animal rights activists than the animals killed during particular 
experimental procedures. 
 
Where individuals in the laboratory start to be respected as individuals 
by humans is where they pass over the boundaries from the world of 
'data' to becoming a pet. Researchers working with animals sometimes 
designate particular animals as pets, so removing them from the realms 
of potential experimental animals.  Naming the individual is one way of 
doing this; it is much harder to do something nasty to a Rita than to a 
numbered rat. 
  
I can well recall the occasional animal that passed through our hands that 
would become special 'like a pet' - whose death we would mourn in a 
way that we did not mourn for all of the other animals, who remained 
numbers in cages. Cyril, for example, was a white rat whose front teeth 
did not meet properly in the middle. Rather than 'cull' him (lab-speak for 
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killing), we removed him from the experimental cages and kept him as a 
pet, clipping his teeth into shape regularly so that he could eat. 
 
Still, those concerns about killing did not for a long while actually stop 
me from doing science.  I knew that animals were going to have to be 
killed. I knew that some of the procedures I might have to use were 
somewhat invasive. Yet I swallowed my feelings about those for many 
years - such is the power of the desensitization that comes through 
scientific training.  
 
Ironically, I was a vegetarian all this time. Eating animals was to me 
unethical, even unthinkable, and I did not want to be part of it. Yet there 
are many parallels between the meat industry and the breeding and 
maintenance of animals in laboratories. Large numbers are bred in order 
to be killed in both cases,  and wastage is considerable. In both 
industries, too, animals must be killed (sacrificed?) deliberately: an 
animal that ups and dies on its own cannot count either as data or as a 
meal. 
 
Meanwhile, in the lab I dissociated myself. To be a scientist in the lab 
meant having two, quite different, relationships to animals. My 
experience of those animals with whom I lived and played was so much 
at odds with my experience of animals in the laboratory. In lab work, you 
end up treating animals in groups. Animal 39/2/F is just a number in a 
cage. She represents a group or a treatment or a species, but you know 
nothing about her own history, about her life with her companions. 
 
For all that I was fascinated by science (and still am), doing it has meant 
for me a sense of alienation, sometimes as a woman in a (still) largely 
male world,  and more often as someone who cares deeply about 
animals. Cyril was lucky; his difference allowed him to become special. 
Most of the many millions of animals that pass through the world's 
laboratories each day are not.  
 
It is distressing to be in a lab around people who are being cavalier with 
animals. There is a disrespect in the way some people handle the animals 
they use - not many people, perhaps, but enough. The animals often seem 
to be tools, means to an end (and certainly become so when reduced to 
numbers in the scientific report). Perhaps people don't mean to be cruel - 
but stunning a rat by swinging it round by the tail while cracking jokes is 
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hardly a sign of respect. On the other hand, I don't know that anyone who 
wants to stun a rat would be able to behave in any other way. Is it 
possible to have respect for the animal you are about to stun and 
decapitate?  Cracking jokes may be a way of coping with doing 
something that, in other contexts, would be considered quite horrible. It 
is, if you like, a way of giving the act a different name. 
 
Naming nature: making scientific stories 
 
Science is, ostensibly, about discovering how the world works; it is 
meant to be the pursuit of truth and proof. Maybe so, but it is also - as 
many critics have pointed out - deeply imbued with the values of the 
wider society.  So its twin tasks of naming and describing nature are not 
innocent.  How animals are described in scientific texts and natural 
history programmes on television have considerable impact on how we 
collectively 
think about them.  
 
That process helps to ensure that we continue to see non-human animals 
as inferior to humans. Indeed, it is only quite recently that there has been 
much scientific interest at all in the question of 'animal minds' or animal 
consciousness. In my training,  we were strongly discouraged from the 
sin of 'anthropomorphism' - attributing human feelings to animals. What 
that means is that you can talk at home about how much Rover 
understands,  but woe betide you if you even think about what Cyril is 
feeling in the lab.  The result, inevitably, is that scientists learn double-
speak. Perhaps we might get away with jokey references to animal 
feeling or thought in the experiments: but then you must go away and 
write that arcane language of scientific articles that denies any feelings at 
all. 
 
There are perhaps unsurprisingly many attempts to refute any evidence 
that shows animals to be clever.There is too much invested, both 
scientifically and culturally, in the notion of animal irrationality and 
inability.  Culturally, we in the West have come to want to separate 
ourselves from nature,  to shore up the boundaries between clever 
humans and those furry, feathered and finned 'others' who are not human. 
  
The more easily that they become 'others' the more easily we can treat 
them with disrespect - whether they are other humans or other species.  
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That is why many scientists can accept working with rats and mice, but 
would find it difficult to work with primates: they are too like us. I am 
also reminded of an anecdote about a scientist who felt that it was easier 
for him to use greyhounds than other dogs, because they did not 'look at 
you in the same way'. I shuddered when I heard that story, and thought of 
my beautiful lurchers (relatives of greyhounds); Ginny was not 'other', 
but part of my life and I of hers. 
 
Even if scientists begin to study animal minds, there remains the problem 
of how to interpret research findings. Humans are rather too good at 
disparaging what an animal does, especially if it fails to perform a task in 
the way that we would do it, and on our terms. Many books recount the 
tale of the horse 'Clever Hans',  who allegedly could count. When it 
turned out that Hans was responding to his owner's unconscious cues, his 
abilities were discounted. But to me that is still pretty clever; I would not 
use the story to dismiss his abilities, merely because he did not seem to 
'count' the way we do. I doubt that I could spot those subliminal cues to 
which Hans responded. 
 
Those who train animals might well wonder why it has taken science so 
long to catch up with what they have long known about animal thinking. 
They might sometimes adopt the languages of science - talking 
behaviouristically of conditioning, for example - while simultaneously 
believing in the animal's abilities to form complex concepts. Admittedly,  
the kinds of animals that we train in depth are nearly always mammals or 
birds; hence, we know relatively little about the concept formation of 
other kinds of animals.  
 
There is a strong belief that animals are simply not as smart as we are. 
Yet interpreting 'stupidity' is not easy, even among ourselves. In looking 
at 'animal consciousness', Radner and Radner note the case of a species 
of bee that was fooled by experimenters into repeating a particular 
behaviour pattern over and over again1 (the bees respond to the odour of 
oleic acid, indicating to them that there is a dead bee in the hive that 
should be removed. The experimenters daubed oleic acid onto a live bee, 
and found that the bees repeatedly tried to remove it). Now, the 
behaviour can be thought of as illustrative of bee stupidity. But why are 
we so sure that they are simply being stupid? 
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We ourselves cannot always recognize death, the Radners note, even 
with the aid of high-tech medical apparatus. And we make allowances 
for humans to be credulous or gullible even when they persist in 
irrational beliefs,  while 'animals...are expected to be perfect little 
scientists. In order to earn the epithet "conscious" they must be proficient 
in logic, ever ready to change their beliefs in the face of available 
evidence, careful to take all considerations into account. When people 
fail to live up to this idea, we say they are all too human. When animals 
fail, they are said to be machine-like'. 
  
There is an issue moreover about the conditions in which the animals are 
tested by humans, as well as those in which they live. The animals used 
in such tests are usually kept in relatively impoverished conditions,  and 
given tests that may not be particularly appropriate for their species. Yet 
scientists can still conclude lesser intelligence! Even humans would 
come out pretty stupid if given tests of their ability to find their way by 
smell,  or if they had spent their life living in a space the size of a small 
bathroom. 
   
Shoring up the intellectual boundaries between us and other animals 
seems to be something of a cultural preoccupation, a protection against 
great anxiety. In a preface to a short story, Ursula Le Guin reflects on 
this,  noting that 
 
Some linguists deny the capacity of apes to talk in quite the 
same spirit in which their intellectual forbears denied the 
capacity of women to think. If these great men are 
threatened by Koko the gorilla speaking a little [sign 
language], how would they feel reading a lab report written 




Living socially: humans and other animals 
   
Perhaps it does not matter that science makes these claims that animals 
are qualitatively different from us. Yet the very same science also 
expects to work on the assumption that non-human animals are 
sufficiently similar to us that we can justifiably use them as 'models' for 
us in experiments. Surely there is a contradiction here? 
 
 53 
Part of the reason why scientists can live with this contradiction is 
precisely the reliance on data from groups or species (unless, ironically, 
it is intelligence itself which is studied: then individuals may well be the 
focus of attention). But when animals come in numbered lots (like rats in 
stacked cages) it is much easier to ignore their idiosyncrasies. It is also 
easier to ignore their status as sentient animals and to behave as though 
they are merely tools of the laboratory. I well remember the technicians 
in one laboratory I visited telling me that they had to swap the rats from 
clear plastic cages to opaque ones. The reason,  they said, was that the 
scientists were disturbed 'because the rats would come and look at you'. 
Looking with interest at the humans outside is something a sentient 
animal might do:  test tubes do not. 
 
By contrast to the numbered lots of rats in the lab, I knew all the animals 
at home, my horses or dogs, as individuals; I worked with them and 
knew their idiosyncrasies. I trained the horses daily and began to 
understand their individuality. Scientific accounts based on such 
individual stories would be considered insufficient for any 
generalizations about the species, horse. Yet after many years of working 
with horses, I have a strong suspicion that I know that species far, far 
better (and thus in a way that is more predictive of its behaviour) than I 
know any of the species that I worked with in the laboratory. Yet isn't 
science supposed to be about its ability to make predictions about the 
natural world? 
 
What I have learned from companions at home is how intelligent they 
are,  what love they have to give, how beautiful their movements are and 
about their different personalities. I learn too how patient they are in 
trying to get us to understand what they have to say - and how often we 
fail. Science could never teach these things. 
 
Still the laboratory work had its own value in the development of my 
own thinking about our relationship to animals and what that means. It 
was through working with rats, for example, that I came to appreciate 
better what fine animals they are. I know full well the cultural loathing of 
these animals which is played on by organisations defending animal use 
in science as they point to the fact that most experiments are done on rats 
and mice. Thus the British Research Defence Society points out to the 
public that some 85 per cent of experiments are done on these creatures - 
as though that somehow makes them more acceptable. People who have 
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not had such relatively privileged lives as I have had may of course have 
good reason to hate or fear them. Rats there are aplenty in the stables but 
I have none infesting my house, and I cannot imagine what it must be 
like to have them nibble my toes in my sleep. Cultural antipathy to rats 
certainly has some grounding in the history of disease: yet it is also 
loaded with myth,  just as stories about the 'fearsomeness' of wolves 
abound. As I watched them and worked with them  so I grew to like 
them,  those little white rats with pink eyes (like Cyril) or the black and 
white ones with sparkling dark eyes. I learned to appreciate their 
curiosity and watchfulness, their playfulness, and their obvious 
intelligence in spite of their impoverished lives in laboratory cages. 
Every day that I entered the lab, I spoke to the rats - 'Hi, everyone!'. I 
enjoyed their company. And every day my unease grew. To begin with, I 
simply changed procedures, so that the animals were interfered with as 
little as possible. But then one day I walked in and lifted the little wire-
mesh trap door of a cage as it sat on the floor. In the cage were a group 
of young sisters, black and white adolescent rats.  Curious,  they all came 
to the gap in their ceiling, putting their tiny paws onto the edge of the 
wire, their bright black eyes sparkling and their whiskers whisking. I 
looked at their paws, like miniature hands, at their glossy coats in 
different patterns, and I marvelled at their inquisitiveness. I knew then 
that I had had enough. 
 
Ironically, I think that the work I do now has more to do with science, in 
the sense that it is deeply motivated by my love of the natural world and 
of animals. I continue to think, teach and write about 'how we think 
about animals'. I did that as a working scientist, too: but now, I am 
willing to range more widely, not to restrict myself. In that venture, I am 
reminded of what philosopher Sandra Harding has said of science - that, 
despite its pretences at objectivity, it cannot be strongly objective unless 
it takes proper account of the 'missing voices'. For her, that includes all 
kinds of human 'others' marginalized from science.3  For me, that must 
also include non-humans. 
  
Living with animals has made me sensitive to the complex ways in 
which they and we become integrated into a social relationship. 
Domestic horses,  for instance, are not just 'broken', as the saying goes. 
Rather, they are usually assimilated into relationships with us (and us 
with them) from the day they are born. So too are domestic dogs. Yet 
science has almost nothing to say about the emergence of relationships 
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between humans and non-humans,  or about the ways in which particular 
kinds of animal enter human society. To be sure, we can read about the 
'instincts of the dog' derived from its wolf ancestors, and about how 
these predispose dogs to behave socially in certain ways. But where are 
the studies of how dogs become socialized into human ways?  Or even us 
into theirs? 
                        
I have often wondered what science might look like if, instead of having 
animals in numbered lots, they were treated respectfully as individuals.  
Now my work includes thinking about what science might have become,  
had its history been different, had it not relied on distancing ourselves 
from nature. What stories would scientists tell if they spent their days 
with Cyril instead of cages 34- 40? How would their tales change if they 
had watched Tess, or Ginny, instead of watching machines printing out 
data from beagles? They could no longer pretend to be distancing 
themselves from nature; rather, they would have to listen. They might 
even find that Cyril, or Ginny and Tess, had rather a lot to say, about life, 
the universe, and even humans. 
 
But can we listen? 
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